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Special Section: Euthanasia and Public Policy
Terminal Sedation as Palliative Care:
Revalidating a Right to a Good Death
GEORGE P. SMITH, II
. . . .We are such stuff
As dreams are made on;
and our life
Is rounded with a sleep. . . .
William Shakespeare
The Tempest, Act IV, Scene 1
Not everyone finds a “salvific meaning” in suffering.1 Indeed, even those who
do subscribe to this interpretation recognize the responsibility of each individ-
ual to show not only sensitivity and compassion but render assistance to those
in distress.2 Pharmacologic hypnosis, morphine intoxication, and terminal seda-
tion provide their own type of medical “salvation” to the terminally ill patient
suffering unremitting pain.3 More and more states are enacting legislation that
recognizes this need of the dying to receive relief through regulated adminis-
tration of controlled substances.4 Wider legislative recognition of this need
would go far toward allowing physicians, in the exercise of their reasonable
medical judgment, to administer a range of narcotics and barbiturates to the
terminally ill without fear of legal sanctions. Sadly, social attitudes and gov-
ernmental concerns about the spread of drug addiction provide an undeniable
policy nexus that impedes unduly a rational approach or exception for the
treatment of pain experienced by the dying.5
Pain Management
One report has suggested that more than 50% of patients with terminal cancer
have physical suffering during the last days of their life controlled, as such,
only by sedation.6 Another report shows that 40% of all dying patients in the
United States die in pain.7 Recently, the Institute of Medicine found that any-
where from 40% to 80% of patients with terminal illness report that their
treatment for pain is inadequate and prolongs the very agony of death.8
The emancipation principle of palliative care states clearly that no scientific
or chemical efforts should be spared to enable dying persons to escape from
pain that “shrivels their consciousness” and prevents them from maintaining
dignity in their final days.9 Indeed, the goal of continually adjusted care demands
that those who are hopelessly ill be given whatever medication is needed to
control pain.10 While there can be little dispute about the validity of this prin-
ciple, there is a widening gap between what can be done and what in fact is
done to implement the emancipation principle.11 Stated otherwise, although
pain can be managed, the central problem remains how to deal with situations
where pain management is merely palliative and the disease symptomatology
giving rise to the pain itself continues a malignant progression toward death —
resulting in an exceedingly low or even nonexistent quality of life for the
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patient and unendurable and refractory episodes of dyspnea, delirium, myo-
clonus, vomiting, and intractable pain.12
An Alternative or a Continuum of Care
While it has been argued that palliative care is the principal alternative to
euthanasia, others contend palliation and euthanasia are but a continuum of
medical treatment.13 Indeed, some physicians maintain that providing final
assistance for the hopelessly ill upon request is a professional responsibility
and sound medical practice as such.14 Still others suggest that in specific con-
texts terminal sedation “is covert physician assisted suicide or euthanasia.”15
The very integrity of acceptance and use of sedating pharmacotherapy is tied
inextricably to two principles: informed consent and double effect. Before seda-
tion is prescribed and initiated for control of refractory symptoms or those that
include a terminal disease with impending death, all other types of palliative
treatment should be exhausted. Additionally, there should be mutual agree-
ment by the patient and his or her family of the need for terminal sedation and
a full knowledge of the double and ultimate effect of the actions together with
the execution of a valid do-not-resuscitate order.16
Others have suggested that intravenous barbiturate administration is a pref-
erable alternative to extended use of narcotics, which always runs a risk of
severe toxicity (e.g., depression, constipation, nausea, dysphoria, and drug tol-
erance). By use of a single hypnotic agent, somnolence or pharmacologic hyp-
nosis may achieve the same sedating effect, thereby dissociating patient
consciousness from refractory symptomatologies.17 Benzodiazepines may be
used as a second drug to alleviate noxious side effects or used simply as
singular agents in these circumstances.18
More and more, as palliative care management develops a national —if not,
indeed, international —praxis, it can be hoped that terminal sedation will in
time be understood as but a continuum of proper treatment. Efforts must be
undertaken to assure that terminal sedation does not fall into a quagmire of
taxonomical confusion. If viewed as an action that validates personal autonomy
or self-determination, this type of palliative care will no longer be seen incor-
rectly as either euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide. Rather, with this reclas-
sification or clarification in terminology will come an understanding of a medically
proper way to assure a modicum of dignity at death.
A New Medico-Legal Right
Although a unanimous United States Supreme Court held in June 1997 that
there was no federal or fundamental right to commit suicide or, thus, to have
assistance in effecting it,19 two concurring opinions would appear to validate
legally the medical right to terminal sedation as an efficacious form of pallia-
tive treatment for intractable pain. Indeed, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor opined
that those individuals suffering from a terminal illness accompanied with great
pain may presently —in the states of New York and Washington —obtain what-
ever level of medication determined professionally by a physician will “allevi-
ate that suffering, even to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening
death.”20
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Justice John Paul Stevens went further in his concurring analysis to probe
the full extent of one’s liberty interest in defining a personal concept of exis-
tence. He concluded that since palliative care cannot alleviate every degree of
pain and suffering for all patients, there may be situations in which a com-
petent person could make an informed judgment or ”a rational choice for
assisted suicide.021 Legal approbation was given specifically to the unequivo-
cal AMA endorsement of the policy allowing pain-killing medication for ter-
minally ill patients —up to and including use of terminal sedation —even if
death is hastened.22
For Justice O’Connor, the central issue in this area of consideration is finding
a definition of terminal illness and, similarly, safeguarding the voluntariness of
patient decisions that have the effect of hastening death.23 Although sound,
reasonable judgment will always be the touchstone for a determination of
terminality —with each disease etiology shaping this decision —recognition of
the validity of the tests for determining medical futility would go far in resolv-
ing this conundrum. With this would come, it is to be hoped, an additional
realization that wider use of terminal sedation as sound palliative care would
provide a more acceptable patient choice for self-determination than recourse
to both the idea and practice of assisted suicide or of euthanasia.24
Normative Standards of Conduct
Legislative definitions may be proferred for what is a terminal medical condi-
tion, and may include incurable and irreversible conditions that “within rea-
sonable medical judgment” will either cause death “within a reasonable period
of time” or merely extend the dying process.25 Depending again, of course,
upon individual patient profiles and disease etiologies, medical judgment will
vary as to when conditions are terminal.
One approach to resolving this quandary is to be found in wider accep-
tance of the doctrine of medical futility. By utilizing 1 of 5 operative stan-
dards under this doctrine, a physician could conclude that a patient’s condition
is indeed terminal and proceed to search a wide range of palliation options —
with terminal sedation being a first order consideration. Accordingly, in cases
where a cure is physiologically impossible, continued treatment is nonbenefi-
cial, a desired or positive benefit is unlikely to be achieved, a particular
treatment option (although regarded as plausible) has yet to be validated, or
a determination is made that a course of treatment is either quantitatively or
qualitatively futile, a physician is freed ethically from pursuing further med-
ical treatment.26
AMA Guidelines
Although a terminal illness may well last months or even years, the actual
dying process takes anywhere from a few days to a week or two to complete.27
It is through the dying process that one may seek to learn that a good death
should be but a complement to a life well lived.28
Guidelines for good patient care in end-of-life cases are indispensable to the
whole educative process here. Initiating an educational dialogue between health-
care professionals and the public at large on this very topic was commenced at
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the June 1997 meeting of the House of Delegates of the American Medical
Association. At this meeting, 8 guidelines entitled “Elements of Quality Care of
Patients in the Last Phase of Life” were adopted.29 These guidelines, which
provide not only for the assurance of opportunities to discuss and plan termi-
nal care but additional assurance that preferences for withholding or withdraw-
ing life-sustaining supports will be honored, underscore the central importance
of patient dignity and will surely go far in educating the medical profession to
the legitimate fears of the terminally ill.30
New Directions
There is both a moral imperative and a political mandate for national health
policies to provide more humane end-of-life care for the dying.31 In particular,
the extent to which palliative medicine can and should provide a type of
quality care insurance for those who are dying appears at last to be within
public acceptability, with various palliative care teams in fact becoming more
popular in healthcare centers throughout the country. Most normally, such a
team is composed of a physician, a nurse, a pharmacist, a social worker, and a
chaplain, all acting as basic consultants to those consigned to terminal care. The
work of these teams has a salutary effect on broader efforts to show by indi-
vidualized example that palliative care is not solely about preventing pain for
those who are dying, but —as well —seeking to deal forthrightly with a plethora
of psychological, social, and spiritual problems confronting the patients and
their families. Palliative medicine can, in many cases, fill the void of hopeless-
ness in the lives of the hopelessly ill and thereby lift the veil of despair that has
forced a demand for assisted suicide because of the very real fear that there is
not quality in end-of-life care.32
To those disposed to tendentiousness, the suggestion of a taxonomical change
of assisted suicide terminology in order to recognize the right of competent,
terminally ill individuals to exercise autonomy or self-determination through
use of terminal sedation in palliative management would be viewed as but a
shallow ruse.33 The process of public education needed to effect a significant
change here is admittedly complex. Indeed, society may not be equipped to
grasp the full consequences of such an educative dialogue on this topic. It
therefore remains the primary responsibility of the medical profession —
supported by law —to provide the leadership needed to rethink the standards
of humane care for treatment at the end of life.34
By accepting and applying standards of medical futility to come to grips with
a more uniform approach to and understanding of terminal illness, a ready
willingness in turn will be seen to accept the use of terminal sedation as a part
of palliative treatment and, thus, part of a more comprehensive right to die
with dignity and without intractable pain and suffering.35 Indeed, as has been
argued, this form of care can be viewed truly as part of a continuum of health-
care to which every individual should be entitled.36
With the recent effort undertaken by Justice O’Connor and Justice Stevens in
the U.S. Supreme Court,37 the nation is now being led in a re-evaluation of the
ethical validity, medical propriety, and legal correctness of terminal sedation as
a normative standard of humane conduct and palliative treatment at the end of
life.
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